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I. INTRODUCTION
As arbitration clauses become popular features in the terms and
conditions of account agreements between banking and investment firms,
states have struggled with ensuring that the designated arbitral fora are fair to
consumers. Recently, however, the securities industry gained an advantage
when a United States District Court found that a valid arbitration clause
administered by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) could be
enforced because the applicable federal law preempted stricter, more
protective state standards. 1
11. CASE HISTORY
Plaintiff Richard Mayo opened an investment account with Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Company ("Morgan Stanley") in June of 2000.2 The
account agreement Mayo signed required consent to abide by all terms and
conditions, including a provision specifying that all disputes between the
parties would be subject to binding arbitration. 3
A. Basis of the Suit
Mayo's suit arises from thousands of dollars of unauthorized point-of-
sale and automated teller machine (ATM) transactions he reported to Morgan
Stanley, which occurred in October and November of 2000.4 While Morgan
Stanley credited the amount of the point-of-sale transactions to Mayo's
account, it refused to credit the amount of the ATM withdrawals.5 Mayo, a
California resident, filed suit in a California state court claiming that Morgan
Stanley's refusal to credit the amount of the ATM transactions violated both
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act 6 and California's Unfair Competition
* Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
1 See id. at 1116.
2 Id. at 1099.
3Id.
4Id.
5 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
6 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2003).
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Law. 7 Morgan Stanley removed the case to federal court, and thereafter,
moved to compel arbitration. 8
In accordance with the arbitration provision of the account agreement,
Mayo. filed with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to commence
arbitration. 9 Under the terms of the submission, as well as the approved rules
of the NYSE, 10 the arbitration would be governed by the "'Constitution, By-
Laws, Rules, Regulations, and/or Code of Arbitration Procedure of the
sponsoring organization."'I' I Before an arbitrator could be appointed, the
Judicial Council of California promulgated new ethics standards for
arbitrators, 12 which the NYSE claimed were in conflict with the standards it
is bound to follow under its SEC-approved rules. 13 Because of the effect of
the standards, the NYSE informed Mayo that it had temporarily suspended
the appointing of arbitrators in California. 14
1. The California Ethics Standards
The Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration
("Standards")15 apply to any person sitting "as a neutral arbitrator pursuant to
an arbitration agreement."' 16 The Standards apply to any arbitrator appointed
on or after the effective date of July 1, 2002, and generally favor individual
consumers over corporations. 17 Intended to "promote public confidence in
7 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200.
8 Id.
9 1d. at 1100.
10 As a self-regulating organization (SRO), the NYSE is registered and closely
monitored by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See generally Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000) (containing supervisory provisions
governing SROs). Under the Securities Exchange Act, an SRO's rules and regulations
must be approved by the SEC prior to their implementation. § 78s(b)(1). As one of its
functions, the NYSE provides arbitration to resolve disputes in the securities industry.
Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. The arbitral process is regulated by the SEC. Id. The
NYSE must comply with both the Securities Exchange Act and the provisions of its own
rules. See § 78s(g).
11 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
12 Id.
13 See id. at 1102.
14 1d. at 1100.
15 The Standards are codified in Division VI of the Appendix to the California Rules
of Court. See CAL. R. CT. tit. 7, ch. 6, App. Div. VI (West Supp. 2003).
16 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West Supp. 2003).
17 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1100-01.
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the arbitration process," 18 the Standards include increased disclosure
requirements for arbitrators. 19 For example, an arbitrator must disclose "all
matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a
doubt that the proposed arbitrator would be able to be impartial." 20 Standard
8 provides additional disclosures in consumer arbitrations "in which a
dispute resolution provider organization is ... administering the
arbitration." 21
2. Sanctions
Failure to make the required disclosures results in arbitrator
disqualification upon a motion by any party entitled to the disclosure.22 More
importantly in the Mayo case, section 1286.2 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure provides that an arbitration award may be vacated if the court
determines that the arbitrator (1) failed to provide timely disclosure of
information of which the arbitrator was aware, which would be ground for
disqualification, or (2) was subject to disqualification but failed, upon
demand, to disqualify himself or herself.23 "In other words, failure to comply
with the disclosures required by the .... [S]tandards results in mandatory
vacatur of an arbitration award."'24
B. Opposition by the NYSE and SEC
The NYSE filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the Judicial
Council of California, seeking an exemption for self-regulating organizations
(SROs) and arguing that the Standards conflicted with its own SEC-approved
rules.25 The NYSE and the SEC, as amicus, argued that the Securities
Exchange Act and the Federal Arbitration Act preempt the Standards, thus
exempting SROs (e.g., the NYSE) from compliance. 26 The NYSE continued
18 CAL. R. CT. tit. 7, ch. 6, App. Div. VI, standard 1(a) (West Supp. 2003).
19 See generally CAL. R. CT. tit. 7, ch. 6, App. Div. VI (West Supp. 2003).
20 Id. at Standard 7(d).
21 Id. at Standard 8(b).
2 2 Id. at Standard 10.
23 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1102.
26 Id.
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its temporary moratorium on assigning arbitrators in California 27 and
designated Reno, Nevada as the site of Mayo's arbitration hearing. 28
C. Mayo's Motion to Vacate
Refusing to arbitrate out of state, Mayo filed a motion to vacate the
arbitration order on the grounds that the moratorium on the assignment of
California arbitrators made the agreement to arbitrate void for impossibility,
frustration of purpose, and unconscionability. 29 Morgan Stanley, the NYSE,
and the SEC opposed Mayo's motion on the basis that the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Securities Exchange Act preempt the Standards. 30
Despite Mayo's failure to follow appropriate procedural requirements, 31
the court examined the merits of the case "because of the importance of the
issues to be decided."32
II. HOLDING OF THE COURT
The court held that the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) preempt the California ethics standards 33 because (1) the parties
had elected to be governed by federal law, 34 (2) the Standards conflicted with
27 Id. The NYSE did, however, offer investors the option of arbitrating their claims
outside of California where the Standards would not apply. Id.
28 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. In November 2002, the NYSE declaratory relief
action was dismissed on the ground that defendants had Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Id. At the same time, the SEC granted approval of an interim NYSE rule requiring
California investors to either waive the Standards in order to proceed with arbitration in
California, or proceed with out-of-state arbitration. Self-Regulatory Organizations, 67
Fed. Reg. 69,793 (Nov. 12, 2002).
29 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
30 Id. at 1103.
31 Mayo did not clarify under what authority he filed his motion to vacate the
arbitration order. The court briefly examined Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60,
which permit the court to set aside or change an order pursuant to a motion, and
determined that neither one applies unless a final judgment has been entered. Id. Turning
to local court rules, the court noted that a party may move for reconsideration after
obtaining leave of court to do so. Id. (citing Civ. L.R. 7-9(a)). Although Mayo did not
comply with these requirements, the court construed his motion under Civil Local Rule 7-
9 and continued its analysis.
32 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
33 Id. at 1116.
34 Id. at 1105.
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federal law, 35 and (3) SROs have no obligation to comply with conflicting
state regulations.36
A. Exchange Act Preemption
The court reasoned that because the Securities Exchange Act grants the
SEC broad supervisory powers over SROs, which such organizations must
follow, 37 SROs have no authority to act independent of SEC oversight.38
Although Congress has not expressly stated that federal regulation preempts
state laws affecting SROs, the court noted that state law may not conflict
with federal law or "'stand[] as an obstacle"' to the regulatory objectives. 39
Giving deference to the position of the SEC, the court noted that the
regulatory agency itself is in the best position to interpret the Securities
Exchange Act and to decipher which state laws stand as an obstacle to its
implementation. 40 Because NYSE Arbitration Rule 600(g)4 1 made clear that
the Standards would not apply to SROs, the NYSE rules promulgated under
SEC authority were in direct conflict with the new Standards. Because Mayo
had specifically chosen the NYSE rules in his agreement to arbitrate before
the NYSE, the conflicting Standards were preempted by the federal law
selected by the parties to govern the arbitration. 42 Additionally, the court
noted that allowing states to adopt varying requirements governing SROs
would conflict with the policy of maintaining uniform procedural rules for
arbitration of claims involving federally regulated SROs.43
35 Id. at 1111. Most conflicting is NYSE Arbitration Rule 600(g), enacted in
response to the Standards, requiring California investors to either waive the Standards in
order to arbitrate in California, or else arbitrate out of state. Id. at 1105. Also in conflict
were provisions of the Standards which require greater disclosure than the NYSE rules
and provisions of the Standards which would provide disqualification of arbitrators or
vacatur of awards when the NYSE would not. Id. at 1110. The court also found that
allowing states to impose their own standards on SROs would conflict with the federal
policy of maintaining a uniform and national securities regulation scheme. Id. at 11 10-
11.
36 Id. at 1112.
37 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1107.
40 Id. at 1109 n.15.
41 See generally id. at 1103 n.7, 1106 (providing a brief history of NYSE Rule
600(g)).
4 2 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
43 Id. at 1111 ("An important function of the SROs is to conduct securities
arbitrations throughout the United States, and the SEC oversees the SRO arbitration
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
B. FAA Preemption
The court also found that the FAA preempted the new California
Standards." Noting that the FAA was passed as a means of enforcing
arbitration agreements, the court found that Mayo had chosen the NYSE as
the arbitral forum and agreed to be bound by its rules. 45 Federal policy is not
to arbitrate under a certain set of specific rules, but rather to enforce the
agreement as chosen by the parties.46 By choosing the NYSE, Mayo
"incorporated the NYSE arbitration rules into his agreement to arbitrate," and
his agreement "neither contemplates nor allows for application of the
California standards." 47 The court found that, under the FAA, Morgan
Stanley had a right to enforce the agreement to arbitrate under its terms.48
TV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULING
On its face, the Mayo decision seems fair-the parties agreed to be
governed by the NYSE rules by choosing it as the forum; therefore, the
NYSE rules should apply. Closer examination reveals the difficult reality of
Mayo's situation and that of the thousands of people who file claims against
SROs each year.
The California Legislature and the California Judicial Council enacted
the new ethics standards in an effort to require greater disclosure by
arbitrators and boost public confidence in the fairness of the arbitration
system.49 The Standards require heightened disclosure in situations involving
consumer arbitrations when a contractually designated dispute resolution
provider is administering the arbitration. 50 These new requirements were
intended to provide additional protection to consumers who have little
opportunity to negotiate the terms of their account agreements.
programs. In accordance with the federal regulatory scheme, the SRO arbitration rules
apply uniformly across the states.").
44 Id. at 1114.
45 Id.
4 6 Id. at 1113.
47 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
48 Id. at 1114 (finding that the FAA allows for the revocation of an agreement to
arbitrate upon only those general grounds existing at law for the revocation of any
contract). "Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws
applicable only to arbitration provisions," and the California Standards clearly applied
only to arbitration agreements. Id. (quoting Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996)).
49 See id. at 1100.
50 Id. at 1100-01.
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It has increasingly become industry standard in the investment and
banking community to require the arbitration of complaints in the terms and
conditions of account agreements. 51 Because Mayo and millions of investors
like him must agree to the non-negotiable terms of securities companies like
Morgan Stanley in order to open an account, they are left with no option but
to agree to the investment company's conditions. Consumers of financial
services are thus stuck when the federal law to which they are contractually
bound provides less protection than the laws of their state.
Speaking just prior to the Mayo case, William Kennedy, the
California securities lawyer representing Mayo, stated:
No court has found that when parties agree to arbitrate in front of the
NYSE, American Arbitration Association or any other arbitration forum it
therefore means (they are) waiving all of the state law. Maybe it never came
up. Maybe no one ever pushed the argument because they thought it
wouldn't win.52
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
however, has now decided that this argument does win.
Kennedy argued that the disclosure requirements in California would
primarily involve data entry into a software program designed to keep
records of cases, protecting consumers from arbitrator conflicts of interest. 53
Additionally, the California Standards provide arbitrators with a more
explicit list of potential conflicts, rather than leaving the decision to disclose
certain issues to the arbitrator's discretion. 54 More explicit standards, he
stated, could actually save time by informing all involved parties-including
the arbitrator-of which situations are grounds for vacatur of an arbitration
award. 55 But because the Standards are state law, they will not apply in cases
similar to Mayo.
In the end, Mayo is a victory for the securities industry. The court did,
however, limit the implications of the case to the specific facts involved,
stating that "[i]f an arbitration agreement allowed for application of
California arbitration rules, the FAA preemption analysis might yield a
51 See generally Alan S. Kaplinski & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services
Arbitration: Last Year's Trend Has Become This Year's Mainstay, 54 Bus. LAW. 1405
(1999).
52 California Hearing to Challenge SRO Arbitration Standards, SEC. WK., Feb. 10,
2003, at 4.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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different result."56 It seems unlikely, however, that any securities firms will
change their arbitration clauses to allow for the application of the stricter
California ethics standards.
Robin L Grant
56 Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
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